Download Anthropocentrism in Philosophy: Realism, Antirealism, by Panayot Butchvarov PDF

By Panayot Butchvarov

Anthropocentrism in philosophy is deeply paradoxical. Ethics investigates the human solid, epistemology investigates human wisdom, and antirealist metaphysics holds that the area is dependent upon our cognitive capacities. yet people sturdy and data, together with their language and ideas, are empirical concerns, while philosophers don't have interaction in empirical examine. And people are population, now not 'makers', of the area. however, all 3 (ethics, epistemology, and antirealist metaphysics) should be significantly reinterpreted as making no connection with humans."

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Its raison d’être was the project of answering the skeptic. Had it succeeded, its mission would have been accomplished, and there would have been room left only for naturalistic epistemology and epistemology-as-logic. Naturalistic epistemology does not beg the question against the skeptic by taking its subject matter to be humans because it is not concerned with the skeptic’s question; Aristotle was no more concerned with skepticism than was Quine. Indeed, though a “theory of knowledge,” naturalistic epistemology need have little concern with knowledge itself.

Strawson, “On Referring” (Mind, 1950) and Introduction to Logical Theory (London: Methuen, 1952), 175 – 179. ’”  Introduction to Logical Theory, 18.  Introduction to Logical Theory, 175. Brought to you by | University of Michigan Authenticated Download Date | 7/1/15 4:55 PM 46 Chapter Two: Three Varieties of Epistemology Some have said that presupposition is merely a feature of language, just “internal” or “pragmatic,” not “logical” or “semantic,” as if pervasive features of language are ever merely features of language.

Few would disagree with Wittgenstein that there are no logical objects – no items, no fragments of the world, that correspond to the propositional connectives and the quantifiers, and thus no distinctive facts that correspond to compound and general statements. No such items and facts belong in what can be “said,” and so they would not count as ordinary denizens of reality. ” Wittgenstein’s distinction between saying and showing thus introduced a position that is neither unqualified logical realism, like that of Frege and Russell, nor unqualified logical antirealism.

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